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Abstract - This paper provides a model for analyzing the 
relationship between boards’ members characteristics 
and companies performances. In this paper, Portuguese 
Banks were studied. An index was used to measure the 
educational qualifications of Banks boards´ members in 
order to quantify their impact on banks’ performance. 
Results show that there is a significant influence of 
education index over banks ROAE but not over banks 
ROAA. 
Keywords - Board’s characteristics; bank performance; 
corporate governance; boards of directors; educational 
background; Portuguese banks. 
1. Introduction 
Some years after the subprime crisis, major 
financial institutions verified that the theme of 
corporate governance remains vital in what concerns 
to maintain the stability of the financial system. To 
show the relevance of this subject, and working as an 
example, De Larosière (2009) considered that 
problems in corporate governance mechanisms were 
one of the causes of the financial crisis. Moreover, 
BCBS (2015) considers that effective corporate 
governance is fundamental to the correct running of 
the banking sector. In OECD (2015) is shown that 
good corporate governance is a mean to generate 
market confidence and business integrity. 
As referred by Levine (2004) there are two 
characteristics of banks that make them special in 
practical terms: the fact that banks have a greater 
level of opacity when compared to other industries 
and the fact that there is also a greater level of 
government regulation in the banking system. 
According to Flannery (1998) banks are not equal to 
other types of firms because of risks involved in the 
banking system in its activity, very particularly the 
“systemic risk”. 
However, there are few studies that include 
financial firms in their samples. But the importance 
of studying the corporate governance on banks is 
even higher than it was in the past. As said by 
Isaksson & Kirkpatrick (2009) the financial crisis can 
be in part associated to failures that occurred in the 
corporate governance arrangements. Adams & 
Mehran (2012) argued that many governance reforms 
do not take into consideration the particularities of 
the banking sector, so that can be a huge problem. 
Becht, Bolton, & Rӧell (2011) emphasized that bank 
governance is different and that would require the 
introduction of other governance aspects different 
from those that are used in traditional governance for 
non-financial firms. Dermine (2011) said that the 
debate on bank governance should consider not just 
the boards but at the same time the governance of 
banking supervision should be considered as well. 
Mehran, Morrison, & Shapiro (2011) considered that 
one big difference between the governance of banks 
and the nonfinancial firms is that the first have many 
more stakeholders. Berger, Imbierowicz & Rauch 
(2014) by their turn concluded that in order to 
evaluate the bank stability, it was of major 
importance to analyze banks’ corporate governance, 
particularly the ownership structure. Erkens, Hung & 
Matos (2012) argued that corporate governance had a 
significant impact on firms performance throughout 
the crisis, regardless to firms’ risk-taking and 
financing policies. Fernandes & Fich (2013) 
indicated that corporate governance is an essential 
part in the management of risk at financial 
institutions. Ladipo & Nestor (2009) considered that 
the low proportion of non-executive directors with 
“financial industry expertise” played a significant 
role in the genesis of the 2007 crisis. Mülbert (2009) 
argued that poor corporate governance of banks was 
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an important cause of the recent financial crisis. 
Nestor (2010) concluded that very few jurisdictions 
had devised extensive bank-specific governance 
requirements.   
However, Beltratti & Stulz (2012) do not found 
arguments supporting the thesis that banks’ 
governance played an important role in the crisis. As 
well, Gupta, Krishnamurti & Tourani-Rad (2013) 
concluded that corporate governance failure is not 
associated with the dramatic decline in stock prices 
that markets suffered worldwide. 
Since the subprime crisis that started in 2007 in 
USA, the Portuguese bank system has suffered many 
different kind of problems. Several situations were 
very serious as it is the case of BPN (2008), BPP 
(2009) and BES (2014), which went to the 
bankruptcy. In some cases, reasons behind these 
bankruptcies derived from the manipulation of 
internal accounting statements. However, the 
problem may be larger than that. It could also be a 
problem related to qualifications of boards’ members. 
A question may be posed: Why did not the board 
of directors do anything timely? 
In general terms, good governance practices 
increase firms’ value. Of course, bad governance 
practices may have high opportunity costs what 
shows the need to identify problems timely.  
This study intends to analyze situations in 
Portuguese Banks related to qualifications of their 
Boards’ members.  
Normally, a bank system is intensely supervised 
by a country’s national central bank. In the case of 
Portugal, this responsibility is taken by Banco de 
Portugal, the Portuguese Central Bank. In 2014 
European Central Bank (ECB) has assumed the 
supervision of main Portuguese banks: CGD, BCP, 
BPI and Novo Banco (ex-BES).  
This paper makes the attempt to deeply explore 
the role of the board of directors in the Portuguese 
banking sector. For that all types of information were 
collected in what concerns to ongoing Portuguese 
banking reforms. The level of effectiveness of the 
boards in the Portuguese banking sector was also 
researched. For that, all Portuguese banks functioning 
in the period of analysis 2007-2011 were analyzed. In 
this study, research was made considering a large 
number of board characteristics (size, composition, 
qualifications and executive compensation), impacts 
of board characteristics on banks performance.  An 
evaluation of the new evidences on the role of the 
board of directors in Portuguese banks was also 
made.  
It is intended also to test if there are significant 
differences between state-owned banks and private 
banks.  
This study devotes to the literature the next 
aspects. First, we include another study specifically 
applied to the banking sector. As said by Adams & 
Mehran (2012) the majority of studies exclude 
financial firms from their samples. 
Second, this paper also provides a wider picture 
of the board structure and its role in the Portuguese 
banking sector. For that, we use a detailed set of 
board characteristics in order to analyze the impacts 
of different aspects of boards on banks performance.  
Third, we analyze the whole Portuguese banking 
system, what means the entire population. As far as it 
is possible to know, this constitutes the first paper 
doing that. Our analysis do not consider only listed 
banks but also non-listed banks. This can be 
important as it gives new insights in what is related to 
the comparison between characteristics of large banks 
and smaller banks.  
Fourth, it is important to analyze the Portuguese 
banking system once Portugal was one of the 
countries that more suffered with the subprime crisis 
started in 2007. Results of this study will have an 
important impact in the process of prudential 
supervision developed by Bank of Portugal, 
particularly the process of approving members of 
banks boards of directors. For the case of large banks 
the process of supervision is developed by Bank of 
Portugal in association with European Central Bank. 
2. An Overview over Portuguese 
Bank Governance 
The Portuguese banking system has suffered a 
set of changes in last decades, namely the phenomena 
of M&A and also the participation in a larger market 
- the European market. This means that there a larger 
number of competitors and also larger banks when 
compared to the dimension of the Portuguese banking 
system. So, a process of M&A started in the 
Portuguese banking sector as a way for banks to gain 
a bigger scale and competitive advantages. As 
referred by Carvalho (2010), in this process of 
concentration some smaller banks as much as some 
foreign banks gained greater importance. This 
situation increased the level of concentration of the 
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Portuguese banking sector, being now the market 
dominated by five institutions (CGD, New Bank - 
previously named BES, BPI, BCP and Santander). 
CGD, the bank with greater market share, is state-
owned being the other four private banks. Carvalho 
(2010) considered that the Portuguese banking 
system could be considered oligopolistic because of 
the level of concentration in these five banks. Pereira 
(2011) argued that in the Portuguese credit market the 
sharing of information is reduced and there are 
difficulties in obtaining credit, mainly in the 
particular case of individuals. 
For the case of Portugal, the company’s 
governance is regulated by the article 278 of 
Commercial Societies Code which considers three 
types of Corporate Governance Models (Decree-law 
No 76-A/2006 of 29 March): 
• Two One-Tier Models 
o Latin Model or Monist which 
considers a Board of Directors and 
Fiscal Council; 
o Anglo-Saxony Model which 
considers a Board of Directors, 
including an Audit Committee and 
a Certified Public Accountant 
(CPA). 
• One Two-Tier Model 
o Dualist or Germanic which 
considers a Board of Directors, a 
Supervision and General Board and 
a Certified Public Accountant 
CPA). 
In the case of state-owned banks, they need to 
accomplish some specific rules particularly Law 
71/2007 (Public Manager Regulations). For example, 
all board members of CGD need to have at least a 
graduation according to their corporate governance 
report. 
Portuguese listed banks consider, in their 
corporate governance model, regulations from 
Portuguese Securities Market Commission - 
“CMVM”, in particular taking into consideration the 
document “CMVM Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance”. 
All banks in the Portuguese system need to 
accomplish several rules imposed by the supervisor 
(in this case Bank of Portugal). The reference for this 
supervision is the Legal Framework of Credit 
institutions and Financial Companies, approved by 
Decree-law No 298/92 of 31 December. Moreover, 
there are several orientations imposed by the 
European Banking Authority in what concerns to the 
qualifications and professional experience of banks 
board members (EBA orientations - 
EBA/GL/2012/06). This more recent document 
results from the creation of the European Banking 
Authority on 1 January 2011 as part of the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).  
Decree-law No 126/2008, 21 July introduced 
some criteria and procedures to evaluate the 
suitability of the proposed Boards’ Members as well 
as their professional qualifications specifically 
evaluated in terms of academic qualifications and 
professional experience.   
Moreover, the previous directive 2006/48/CE 
was modified with the incorporation of new 
directives from the European Parliament (directive 
2013/36/UE and regulation EU No 575-2013) what 
has originated the Decree-law No 157/2014.  
The regulation EU No 575-2013 in the article 
No 435 describes the necessity of credit institutions 
to publicize their boards’ members recruitment policy 
and also their capacities in terms of knowledge and 
competencies.  
Bank of Portugal, considering its instruction nº 
30/2010, defines the procedures to register the 
board’s members of banks. This includes:  
• an inquiry about professional experience, 
academic qualifications, suitability and 
independence;  
• a detailed curriculum vitae;  
• a copy of the identity card;  
and for the first registration of the person it 
is also needed to add an  
• updated criminal registration certification. 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development 
3.1. Literature Review 
The literature shows that the topic of board of 
directors in what concerns to banks is relatively 
unexplored.  Booth, Cornett & Tehranian (2002) used 
a sample of 100 largest banks and discovered that 
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when insider ownership increases, the percentage of 
outside directors decreases. De Andres & Vallelado 
(2008) found that bank performance has a 
significantly positive relationship with board 
meetings using a sample of large international 
commercial banks. Pathan & Faff (2013) argued that 
both board size and independent directors influence 
negatively the bank performance; their sample 
comprises initially 300 publicly traded bank holding 
companies. Cornett, McNutt & Tehranian (2009) 
using a sample of US bank holding companies found 
that board independence may restrain earnings 
management. Erkens et al. (2012) found that firms 
with more independent boards achieved more equity 
capital during the 2007-2008 crisis (sample of 296 
financial firms from 30 countries). Aebi, Sabato & 
Schmid (2012) argued that banks, in which the Chief 
Risk Officer directly reports to the board of directors 
- not to the CEO, showed a greater level of stock 
returns and ROE. Furthermore, Adams & Mehran 
(2012) discovered that the board size is positively 
associated with the performance; for their analysis 
they used initially a random sample of 35 publicly 
traded banking holding companies. Garcia-Meca, 
Garcia-Sánchez & Martinez-Ferrero (2015), applying 
a sample of 159 banks in 9 countries, found that 
gender diversity increases bank performance, but 
national diversity has the opposite effect. 
The majority of the literature about corporate 
governance in Portugal does not consider the 
financial sector isolate and the only studies that refer 
banks they just analyze listed banks. Alves & Mendes 
(2004) proved that exists a relationship between the 
compliance of some corporate governance 
recommendations and computed (abnormal) returns 
(listed companies in “Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e 
Porto – BVLP”). Rodrigues, Seabra & Mata (2008) 
analyzed the independence of boards’ members of 
Portuguese listed banks and concluded that there 
exists the possibility that managers have a 
discretionary behavior. Marques (2009) found that 
Portuguese companies that accomplish CMVM 
recommendations show a greater level for firm 
performance (sample with the top 250 non-financial 
Portuguese firms). Alves (2011) defended that the 
main determinants of voluntary disclosure are the 
following variables: firm size, growth opportunities, 
organizational performance, board compensation and 
large shareholder ownership. In Business & 
Economics (2014) it is showed that the level of 
Portuguese listed companies that follow the corporate 
governance recommendations is high. Marques 
(2013) argued that companies comprising the PSI-20 
index revealed a high degree of compliance. Pereira 
Alves, Couto & Francisco (2014) argued that CEO 
characteristics, board of directors’ structures, and 
shareholders features are associated with the CEO 
pay (sample of Portuguese listed companies). Banco 
de Portugal (2015) report suggests that there are some 
deficiencies in banks’ boards namely:  
• the board of directors does not monitor 
correctly the executive commission;  
• the process of selection of the non executive 
members is not the best and finally  
• the possible conflict of interests is not well 
preserved. 
3.2. Hypotheses Development 
The literature evidences that in the case of banks 
the board of directors will play a more important role 
when compared to other types of companies. There is 
an opaque nature of the banking business which 
implies greater difficulties in the monitoring process 
as well as greater obstacles in order to evaluate the 
performance of banks as much as boards’ members. 
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate if 
the background of the banks boards’ members will 
affect banks’ performance. For that, we used a unique 
database, being data hand collected from corporate 
governance reports and/or from annual reports. 
Obviously, we used all available information that we 
can get from many different sources.  
As a result of the several changes that occurred 
in the legislation and recommendations in what 
concerns to the topic of corporate governance, we 
intend to test if there are any other aspects that need 
to be included in those reports. 
According to Pereira & Filipe (2014) literature 
about the relationship between boards members’ 
characteristics and the corporate financial 
performance has a series of articles focused on 
boards’ members education. 
Some authors tried to explain the performance of 
companies using the education levels of top managers 
as an independent variable. For example Bhagat, 
Bolton & Subramanian (2010) used 6 CEO education 
variables particularly, for instance, CEOs holding an 
MBA degree or a law school degree. By their turn, 
Gray & Nowland (2013) considered a bachelor, a 
master or yet another degree as one independent 
variable. Ahrens, Filatotchev & Thomsen (2011) 
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argued that future research about corporate 
governance should consider in a very relevant way 
the economic competence, what means to measure 
competencies of boards’ members as it is the 
experience and the education. 
For the purpose of this study, we employ 6 
measures of educational backgrounds of board 
members, particularly  
• graduation in the area of 
business/economics,  
• MBA in the area of business/economics,  
• post graduation in the area of 
business/economics,  
• executive formation in the area of 
business/economics,  
• master degree in the area of 
business/economics and  
• doctorate in the area of business/economics.  
The hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H1. Graduation in the area of business/economics 
held by board members is positively associated with 
the bank performance; 
H2. MBA in the area of business/economics held by 
board members is positively associated with the bank 
performance; 
H3. Post graduation in the area of 
business/economics held by board members is 
positively associated with the bank performance; 
H4. Executive Formation in the area of 
business/economics held by board members is 
positively associated with the bank performance; 
H5. Masters in the area of business/economics held 
by board members is positively associated with the 
bank performance; 
H6. Doctorate in the area of business/economics held 
by board members is positively associated with the 
bank performance. 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.1. Data 
In the analysis, all Portuguese banks are 
considered. However due to several limitations in 
data collection, it was not possible to overcome this 
problem, what made necessary to exclude a part of 
these data. 
This study’s sample comprises the biggest 
financial institutions in Portugal in terms of their total 
assets. This means that it is an empirical study 
representing the population instead of the sample. All 
available information of the boards’ members was 
obtained from BoardEx database, annual reports, 
interim reports and press releases. Financial data was 
obtained from Bankscope database and from annual 
reports of Banks.  
Some errors in databases were found. 
Consequently, data were manually checked in order 
to prevent big differences in terms of final results. 
The boards members’ data include 257 elements but 
at the end  just 155 elements could be used in the 
research because 102 elements made available no 
enough information. So, it was not possible to work 
this information in the research considering the 
insufficient information made available for these 
members. 
4.2. Empirical Methodology 
We used the following main model setup: 
Bank performance= α+ 
 βjboard variablesi,tj +
j
γ control variablesi,t+εi,t 
 
Where i varies from bank 1 to bank 32 and t 
represents values from 2007 to 2011. β coefficient 
measures the impact of different board characteristics 
on bank performance. 
In this study the following variables were 
considered: 
1. Independent variables - The main variable is 
board members’ education. For that an index 
was used, aggregating different levels of 
education namely: 
• GradEdu, a dummy equal to 1 if the board 
member has a graduation in the area of 
business or economics; 0 otherwise. 
• MBAEdu, a dummy equal to 1 if the board 
member has a MBA in the area of business 
or economics; 0 otherwise. 
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• Postgraduated, a dummy equal to 1 if the 
board member has a post-graduation in the 
area of business or economics; 0 otherwise. 
• ExecutiveEdu, a dummy equal to 1 if the 
board member has executive formation in 
the area of business or economics; 0 
otherwise. 
• MasterEdu, a dummy equal to one if the 
board member has a master in the area of 
business or economics; 0 otherwise. 
• PhDEdu, a dummy equal to one if the board 
member has a PhD in the area of business 
or economics; 0 otherwise. 
The “total executive compensation in 2011” was 
also used. This variable was named “execomp11” and 
was considered as one independent variable.  
In terms of the most used performance measures 
by previous studies, four indicators were found:  
• ROA,  
• ROE,  
• Tobin’s Q and  
• cumulative abnormal returns  
For details, see, for instance, Jalbert, Rao & 
Jalbert (2002); DeFond, Hann & Hu (2005); 
Gottesman & Morey (2006); Kroll, Walters & Wright 
(2008); Papakonstantinou (2008); Bhagat et al. 
(2010); Cheng, Chan & Leung (2010); Darmadi 
(2013); Gray & Nowland (2013).  
However, there are some other authors who have 
introduced some different performance measures. It 
is the case of Hau & Thum (2009) who applied for 
example, the log to losses. 
In our case we used has dependent variables: 
• Performance 1 (ROAA - return on average 
assets); 
• Performance 2 (ROAE - return on average 
equity). 
Finally, there are also control variables adopted 
in various articles. A deep observation shows that 
there is a significant preponderance on the following 
ones: natural log of total assets, leverage, board size, 
industry and proportion of outside directors.  
In this paper we used as control variables: 
• Ownership, a dummy equal to 1 if the bank 
is state-owned; 0 otherwise. 
• Assets 07-11, log of average total assets 
(07-11). 
• Tier 07-11, average tier capital (07-11). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Portuguese bank system is composed 
approximately by 30 banks, having one state-owned 
bank (CGD) which has a relevant market share, as 
stated previously. During the period 2007-2011, CGD 
was the bank that in average had a higher level of 
total assets.  
In terms of ROAA (performance 1) the average 
of private banks (0.51%) is higher than the average of 
state-owned banks (-0.92%). However, in terms of 
ROAE (performance 2) the average of state-owned 
banks (16.01%) is higher than the average of private 
banks (5.34%). 
Table 1 also shows that the variable 
“execomp11(value)” has a big difference when we 
compare for example bigger private banks 
particularly those that are listed (BPI, BCP, BES and 
BANIF (IPO only in 2012)) with CGD (the biggest 
state-owned bank). For example, BPI presents an 
executive compensation of 5.3 million euro in 2011, 
while CGD only has an executive compensation of 
0.7 million euro. This is a major difference that can 
reduce highly the attractiveness of talented managers 
for state-owned banks. 
Furthermore, eduindex of state-owned banks 
show a superior value of 1.67 that compares with 
only 1.11 of the private banking sector.   
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5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1. Values for main variables 
Bank Ownership public traded performance1 performance2 Assets 07-11 Tier711 execomp11(value) eduindex 
Banco BPI SA (BPI SGPS prior to 01/2003) 1 1 0.58 11.48 44767.075 8.33 5.3 1.208333 
Banco Comercial Português SA 1 1 0.50 8.37 94,034 8 3.8 1.142857 
Banco Espirito Santo SA 1 1 0.65 8.82 77820.8446 8.12 7.2 1.047619 
Banco Internacional do Funchal SA 1 1 0.24 5.24 14,259.02 8.59 3 1.333333 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos SA 0 0 0.43 8.27 102,004 8 0.7 1.5 
Crédito Agrícola Financial Group 1 0 0.68 8.87 12,943 9 n.a. 0.5 
Banco Popular Portugal 1 0 0.54 8.54 9,149 9 0.8 0.75 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (Portugal) SA 1 0 0.04 1.38 7,001 7 n.a. 1 
Banco Itau BBA International 1 0 1.09 15.73 3,767 13 0.3 1.8 
Banco Finantia 1 0 1.21 7.60 2,937 10 n.a. 1.333333 
Caixa - Banco de Investimento SA 0 0 -2.27 23.76 1,973 9 0.1 1.857143 
Banco BAI Europa 1 0 0.17 5.22 1,108 11 0.368 1 
Banco Credibom 1 0 0.71 8.96 1,243 13 0.507 1 
Banco BNP Paribas 1 0 1.67 13.00 987 10 1.05 1.666667 
Banif - Banco de Investimento 1 0 -0.47 1.23 1,004 8 1.49 1.6 
Banco BIC 1 0 -0.03 -0.71 675 13 0.7 0.75 
Banco BIG 1 0 1.37 10.95 704 33 2.265 1.333333 
Banco Primus 1 0 0.58 8.40 422 14 0.309 1 
Banco Privado Atlântico Europa 1 0 0.10 5.11 134 n.a. 0.679 1.428571 
Finibanco - Holding, SGPS S.A. 1 0 1.66 8.55 3,402 n.a. 0.04 0.5 
Banco Carregosa 1 0 2.07 10.73 85 n.a. 0.383 0 
Credito Agricola, SGPS, SA 1 0 -2.47 -32.58 108 n.a. n.a. 1 
Banco Português de Gestão 1 0 -0.17 -2.74 104 n.a. 0.768 2 
Total Average     0.39 6.27 16,549.25 11.14 1.57 1.16 
Average Private Banks 0.51 5.34 13,174.04 11.49 1.70 1.11 
Average State-Owned Banks     -0.921785714 16.0145 51988.9486 8.325333 0.4 1.678571 
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In table 2, relevant differences can be seen between the minimum value of performance2 (ROAE) and its maximum, -32.58% and 23.76% respectively.  For the variable 
performance1 (ROAA) differences are very slight, a minimum of -2.47% compared to a maximum of 2.07%. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
    eduindex          23    1.163043     .478154          0          2
   execomp11          19    .2815789    .2464473        .01         .8
     tier711          18    11.13722    5.969564       6.78      33.44
performance2          23    6.268695    10.10678     -32.58      23.76
performance1          23     .386087    1.072824      -2.47       2.07
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
 
Figure 1 shows the average education level of banks’ board members, contrarily to what was supposed for state-owned banks which have - in average - a higher 
education level when compared to private banks. Other curious aspect is associated to the fact that non-listed banks show a higher level of boards’ members’ education in 
some types when compared to listed banks; these are the cases for example of MBA, postgraduation, executive education and masters degree. 
Figure 1. Average education level of bank’s board members 
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In figure 2, eduindex for different groups of banks is shown. Eduindex agreggates diferent levels of education and in this case state-owned banks show a much higher 
value when compared with private banks. In the case of listed banks compared with non-listed banks, there is only a slight difference, so it is not possible to conclude that the 
fact of being listed or not can influence the level of education of banks’ boards members. 
Figure 2.  Eduindex for different types of banks 
 
5.2. Regression Analysis 
In table 1 the possible impact of Eduindex in Banks’ ROAA is analyzed. In this case it can be seen that R-squared is approximately 0,2 and that adjusted R-squared is 
0,0321. This means that there is a slightly effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable.  
Considering now P-value of the independent variable “eduindex” which is 0,48681, considerably superior to 0,05, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis. So, the 
variable “eduindex” does not have a significant effect on the Banks’ ROAA. 
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Table 1. Impact of Eduindex in the Bank’s ROAA 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0,450459163 
R Square 0,202913458 
Adjusted R Square 0,032109198 
Standard Error 0,837764147 
Observations 18 
ANOVA 
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 2,501364316 0,833788 1,187988 0,350002935 
Residual 14 9,825882713 0,701849 
Total 17 12,32724703       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Interceptar -0,855168502 1,550218335 -0,55164 0,58989 -4,18005614 2,469719137 
Log(Assets 07-11) 0,118476446 0,127013766 0,932784 0,36674 -0,153940988 0,390893879 
Tier711 0,067179675 0,038861969 1,728674 0,105847 -0,01617096 0,150530309 
eduindex -0,388546087 0,543990064 -0,71425 0,48681 -1,55528873 0,778196556 
 
The regression that considers the effect of Eduindex on Banks’ ROAE (table 2) shows a R-squared of 0,3184 and an adjusted R-squared of 0,1724. In this case there is 
an increase in the power of explanation when compared to data of table 1. 
P-value of the independent variable “eduindex” is 0,027 (which is below 0,05). This means that this variable is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. So, the 
variable “eduindex” influences Banks’ ROAE.  
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Table 2. Impact of Eduindex in the Bank’s ROAE 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0,564287082 
R Square 0,318419911 
Adjusted R Square 0,172367035 
Standard Error 5,084686356 
Observations 18 
ANOVA 
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 169,0984769 56,36615895 2,180168713 0,135862941 
Residual 14 361,9564947 25,85403534 
Total 17 531,0549716       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Interceptar -7,61523589 9,40882234 -0,80937184 0,431842667 -27,79515273 12,56468 
Log(Assets 07-11) 0,538944929 0,770891384 0,699119149 0,495929235 -1,114452645 2,192343 
Tier711 0,160591847 0,235867012 0,680857597 0,507067136 -0,345292578 0,666476 
eduindex 8,140199833 3,301667738 2,465481229 0,027220338 1,058826843 15,22157 
 
In table 3 the possible influence of “Execomp11” on bank’s ROAA is evaluated. In this case the R-squared of 0,3038 is compared to an adjusted R-squared 0,1646. This 
means that there is some considerable explanation power associated with these independent variables.  
However P-value of variable “Execomp11” is superior to 0,05, meaning that this variable is not significant. So, null hypothesis is not rejected, which implies that there 
is no influence of “Execomp11” over the Bank’s ROAA. 
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Table 3. Impact of Execomp11 in the Bank’s ROAA 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0,551202303 
R Square 0,303823979 
Adjusted R Square 0,164588775 
Standard Error 0,864156995 
Observations 19 
ANOVA 
  Df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 4,888544189 1,62951473 2,182091669 0,13260275 
Residual 15 11,20150968 0,746767312 
Total 18 16,09005386       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Interceptar -1,811854977 1,366708124 -1,325707329 0,204773083 -4,724924374 1,10121442 
Execomp11 -0,622233489 1,240712195 -0,501513156 0,623290218 -3,266748921 2,022281944 
ownership 1,922767653 0,826771265 2,325634351 0,034470704 0,160546425 3,684988881 
Log(Assets 07-11) 0,097440972 0,133901208 0,727707942 0,477998504 -0,187962695 0,38284464 
 
For studying the influence of “Execomp11” over Banks’ ROAE, it is possible to register also some interesting power of explanation in the regression but P-value of this 
variable is not significant. So, the variable “Execomp11” does not explain the evolution of Banks’ ROAE. 
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Table 4. Impact of Execomp11 in the Bank’s ROAE 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0,488347508 
R Square 0,238483289 
Adjusted R Square 0,086179946 
Standard Error 5,620227458 
Observations 19 
ANOVA 
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 148,3807485 49,46024949 1,565844092 0,239052255 
Residual 15 473,8043502 31,58695668 
Total 18 622,1850987       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Interceptar 16,37774747 8,888674828 1,842540962 0,085249541 -2,56801437 35,3235093 
Execomp11 4,657406621 8,069233704 0,577180782 0,572379085 -12,54175781 21,85657105 
Log(Assets 07-11) -0,07047383 0,870854776 -0,080924893 0,936571569 -1,926656837 1,785709177 
ownership -9,803382467 5,377081469 -1,823179084 0,08826626 -21,26436027 1,657595333 
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6. Conclusions 
This study allows making an analysis that shows 
that there is a significant influence of “eduindex” 
over Banks’ ROAE. This represents an important 
outcome that shows the necessity of supervisory 
institutions (particularly Banco de Portugal (BdP) 
and European Central Bank (ECB)) to establish more 
rigorous procedures for minimum requirements to an 
individual to be accepted as board member of a bank.  
However, the first regression which considers as 
dependent variable banks’ ROAA does not show 
similar results, meaning that “eduindex” is not 
significant in terms of the evolution of banks’ 
ROAA. 
Moreover, contrarily to what it was expected, 
the variable “execomp11” does not show a significant 
influence neither over banks’ ROAA nor banks’ 
ROAE. In this case and in relative terms, execomp11 
of state-owned banks is lower when compared to 
private banks (considering their dimension) what 
does not seem to have a significant impact. 
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